Introduction
It is quite incredible that while the negotiations of China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are greatly influenced by the deficit that the United States runs in its trade with China, the actual size of the US-China bilateral trade deficit 1 is not actually known! The US puts the 1995 bilateral trade deficit to be $34 billion, while China puts it at $9 billion. If the US figure is correct, then China has the second highest bilateral deficit, after Japan whose bilateral trade deficit with the US is $59 billion. But if China's figure is correct, then the China bilateral trade deficit is lower than that the US bilateral trade deficits with Canada, Mexico, Germany and Taiwan.
Some analysts have interpreted the large US-China bilateral trade deficit as prima facie evidence of unacceptably high levels of protectionism in China, and have advocated stringent entry conditions for China's admission into WTO, even though China is in the poorest third of the world's economies. 2 In response, supporters for easier entry conditions for China have emphasised other factors (e.g. the movement of low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing industries to China from neighboring economies) for the recent widening of the bilateral trade deficit.
Because the overall trade balance of a country equals domestic saving minus domestic investment, the normal expectation is that low-income countries that have high rates of return to investments (e.g. China) should be borrowing from abroad to finance their development.
However, since 1994, China has been running an overall trade surplus that is growing over time.
This counter-intuitive phenomenon of a low-income China that is extending loans to the outside world has strengthened the impression of a mercantilist China intent focussed on export promotion. This impression has its origin in the great extent that China has increased its penetration of the US market over the last decade. Of the 34 categories of manufactured goods imported by the US, China was among the top 5 suppliers in 9 categories in 1995, up from 1 category in 1990 and none in 1985. This paper has two aims. The first is to reduce the range within which the true bilateral trade deficit lies. The second aim is to identify the determinants of the bilateral trade deficit, and offer an assessment of their relative importance. To anticipate our discussion, section 1 presents a smaller range of values for the bilateral trade deficit than in previous studies. We are able to achieve this because we devised a new estimation method that takes advantage of our access to detailed Chinese Customs data at the commodity-by-commodity level. The size of the discrepancy between our revised US figure and the revised Chinese figure is only 4 to 26 percent of the size of the discrepancy between the two official figures. The size of the average discrepancy between the revised figures is only 9 percent of the size of the average discrepancy between the official figures. For example, the revised US-China bilateral trade deficit is $15 billion to $20 billion in 1994, and $16 billion to $22 billion in 1995, compared to the official range of $8 billion to $30 billion, and $9 billion to $34 billion, respectively.
Section 2 of this paper points out that protectionism can influence the overall trade balance only if it can modify saving-investment behavior in the economy, and this requires wealth effects to be uncharacteristically strong and unusually fast to appear. The major cause of China's current account surplus is its high household saving rate. The high saving rate is, in turn, generated by China's demographic profile, the absence of social insurance for the bulk of the population, and the post-1978 appearance of investment-motivated saving in response to the scarcity of formal financial intermediation to finance the investment of the non-state sector.
The widening of the US-China bilateral trade deficit in recent years reflected many factors. In our opinion, the two chief factors are (i) macroeconomic forces in the US and China moving in opposite directions, causing their respective overall trade balance to move in opposite directions; and (ii) the accelerated relocation of production of US imports from East Asia to China.
account deficits for several periods. The bilateral trade deficits and overall trade deficits actually make every country better off because a country that is made worse off can choose to retreat into autarky.
Measuring the Bilateral Trade Deficit -The Role of Hong Kong
Of all the economic issues between the United States and China, none has the potential for greater confusion than the bilateral trade deficit. The official trade statistics of the United
States and China have huge discrepancies. Much of the difference is due to, among others, the different treatment of Hong Kong's entrepôt trade by the two sides. In the 1988-95 period, on the average, over two-third of U.S. imports from China came through Hong Kong.
The resolution of the discrepancy between the U.S. and Chinese data rests large on two issues: first, the accounting of the Chinese goods shipped to the U.S. via Hong Kong; and second, the measurement of the value added by Hong Kong traders to these goods. The U.S.
Commerce Department records the re-exports from Hong Kong as U.S. imports from China. Up until 1993, the Customs General Administrations of China recorded them as Chinese exports to Hong Kong, rather than to the U.S. Since 1993, China has gradually modified this approach to identify the final destination of its exports to Hong Kong, though its accounting of these goods remains incomplete.
The magnitudes of the Hong Kong re-export markups have been estimated in a number of studies, including Fung (1996) , Fung and Lau (1996) , Lardy (1994) , Sung (1991), and West (1995) . The markups cited in these studies come primarily from surveys conducted by Hong Fung, 1996; Fung and Lau, 1996) , the markup for Chinese goods is reported at 25%. Besides showing that the average markup has increased over time, the surveys also indicate that the markup for the Chinese goods is well above the average markup for re-exports through third countries.
A recent report by the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (1996) , a US-China intergovernmental agency, used disaggregate data on Hong Kong's import and re-export trade to estimate the markup for 1992 and 1993. This study (hereafter referred to as the "interagency report") finds that the average markup on Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods to the U.S. is 29 percent of the re-export value. It attempts to reconcile the differing trade statistics of the two countries using the markups and additional information on specific commodities.
The interagency report is a major advance in the estimation of the Hong Kong re-export markups, but it is vulnerable to two potential flaws. First, the import data used in the study only identifies the countries of origin and not the destination countries. This ignores that fact that there are three types of Hong Kong imports from China: imports that are retained in Hong Kong;
re-exports to the U.S.; and re-exports to other countries. Therefore, the overall import unit-value may not reflect the actual unit-value for goods re-exported to the U.S. The distortion on the unitvalue is more likely to be highest for goods where only a small portion is re-exported to the U.S.
Secondly, in the two datasets (Hong Kong imports and re-exports), there are some records that appear to suffer from measurement error, either because different units where used for imports and re-exports, or because these transactions occurred in different calendar years. The estimates obtained for the markups are quite sensitive to these measurement errors.
In this part of the paper, we try to improve the markup estimation in these two respects, overstated. On the other hand, China is unable to count all of the goods leaving its country, and destined for the U.S. via Hong Kong, as an export to the United States. For this reason, the value of the U.S. trade deficit as reported by China is understated. In order to estimate the "true" value of the deficit, it is necessary to compute the value-added in Hong Kong on goods shipped from China to the U.S., and also in the reverse direction. Attributing this value-added as an export from Hong Kong, the discrepancy between the U.S. and Chinese magnitudes of the bilateral trade deficit can be substantially reduced. In the following section we proceed to estimate this value-added.
Markup on Hong Kong Re-exports to the United States
The value-added attributed to Hong Kong equals the markup on the prices of goods shipped through this entrepôt center, multiplied by the value of these goods. There are several estimates of the markup available, as summarized in shown in the first column of Table 2 .
A second estimate of the markup has been made by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics
Department, based on a survey of exporters. These markups are also expressed as a percentage of the re-export value, and are shown in the second column of Table 2 . It can be seen that the markups reported by the Hong Kong survey is less than that estimated in the interagency report. This is no coincidence, but reflects underlying differences in the methodology used to estimate the markup. To explain these differences, we use the example illustrated in Figure 1 .
Consider a product that is shipped from China to Hong Kong, and from there is reexported to the United States and other locations. Suppose that the unit-value of this item when it arrives in Hong Kong is $1.00. This unit-value is the average over all units sent to Hong Kong, regardless of their final destination. It should be stressed that the "overall" unit-value of this type is all that is available in the actual Hong Kong import data. Because imports are collected by source country, but not by eventual destination, it is impossible to distinguish the unit-value of imports destined for the U.S. from those destined for elsewhere. It is precisely this limitation of the Hong Kong data that makes estimation of the markup difficult. To illustrate this, suppose that the goods destined for the U.S. are of higher quality, and have a unit-value of $1.10, while those destined for the rest of the world have a unit-value of $0.90: these unit-values are not observed in the Hong Kong data, however. Then to estimate the markup, one approach is to compare the "overall" unit-value of the Hong Kong imports from China ($1.00) with the unitvalue of the Hong Kong re-exports from China to the U.S. ($1.50). This gives a markup of $0.50, or 33% when expressed relative to the re-export value of $1.50.
This calculation is labeled as Method A in Figure 1 , and corresponds precisely to the calculation performed by the interagency Report, as shown in the first column of Table 2 . That report computed the markup by comparing the "overall" unit-value of Hong Kong imports from China, to the unit-value of Hong Kong re-exports from China to the United States. We have made exactly the same calculation for a wider range of years, using the Hong Kong import and re-export data, and these results are reported in the third column of Table 2 . We see that the markups range from 26.9% to 31.5% over 1988-1995. 7 It is evident that this method will overstate the "true" markup if the Hong Kong imports from China that are destined for the United States are, on average, priced higher than those destined for other markets. In that case, the "overall" unit-value of Hong Kong imports from China is too low, so the markup obtained is to too high. To correct for this overstatement, we can consider an alternative calculation of the markup, which is labeled as Method B in Figure 1 .
Method B compares the "overall" unit-value of Hong Kong import from China ($1.00)
with the "overall" unit-value of Hong Kong re-exports from China to the world ($1.30). Note that both the goods entering Hong Kong and those leaving can be destined for any final market, 7 The formulas used to obtain the markups are described in the Appendix. In principle, the values we obtain for the markup using Method A should be identical to those obtained by the Interagency group in 1992 and 1993. It is evident from Table 2 that the actual values differ somewhat. This may be due to the fact that the Hong Kong data we worked with in those two years were organized by the 5-digit SITC, Revision 3 classification, whereas the Hong Kong data that the Interagency group worked with was organized by the 6-digit Harmonized System classification. This raises the question of whether it is possible to improve upon these approaches, and obtain another estimate of the markup, possibly lying in-between those from Methods A and B.
To achieve this, we will have to rely on data beyond that of Hong Kong imports and re-exports since, as explained above, this data does not distinguish the Hong Kong imports from China that are destined for the United States from those that are destined for elsewhere. This means that the difference in prices of these imports, illustrated by $1.10 and $0.90 in Figure 1 , cannot be measured from the Hong Kong data. In order to measure these prices, we rely instead on the Chinese export data from the General Customs Administration. Using that data, we can distinguish a unit-value for Chinese exports to Hong Kong, destined for the United States, from the unit-value for Chinese exports to Hong Kong that are destined for all other markets. It turns out that the goods destined for the U.S. tend to have higher prices than those destined elsewhere, as illustrated in Figure 1 . By merging the China export data with the Hong Kong import and reexport data, we are therefore able to make a more accurate calculation of the markup, indicated by Method C in Figure 1 .
In Method C, we use the Chinese export data to measure the unit-value of goods exported to Hong Kong and destined for the U.S. ($1.10). This is compared to the unit-value of HongKong re-exports from China to the U.S. ($1.50), giving a markup of $0.40 or 27% when expressed relative to the re-export value of $1.50. In the final column of Table 2 , we report the results from a calculation of this type, using both the Chinese and Hong Kong trade data. 9 We see that Method C gives an estimate of the markup that varies between 22% and 28.7% over 1988-1995, and lies in between that obtained from Methods A and B in every year. Thus, we can treat Methods A and B as providing upper and lower-bounds, respectively, to the "true" markup, and view Method C as giving the preferred estimate. Our calculations have shown how the differences between the interagency report and the Hong Kong Census can reconciled, and improved upon, to obtain an estimate of the markup that lies in-between these two sources.
The same methods we have used above can be applied to measure the markup on Hong
Kong re-exports to any other country. In Table 3 we report the results for re-exports from China to Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In each case, we calculate the markups from methods A and C, since the results for method B -which gives the markup for re-exports from China to the entire world -do not depend on the country of destination. (The results for method B in Table 2 therefore are unaffected when the country of destination changes). It can be seen that the markups for re-exports to Germany are slightly larger than those for the United States, while the markups for Japan are larger still, and the markups to the United Kingdom are somewhat smaller. Overall, the differences with the markups obtained for the United States are not that great, especially as compared to the year-to-year fluctuation in the estimated markups for any country. 10 Method C continues to give smaller estimates of the markup as compared to method A is virtually all cases, and it is our preferred estimate.
We note that the markup for re-exports to the U.S. estimated by Method C in Table 2 shows a broad decline over the 1988-94 period, going from 28 percent in 1988 to 25 percent in 1991, and then to 22 percent in 1994 (though increasing in 1995). This secular decline in markup is consistent with the competitive effects of more firms entering into the re-export industry over time. However, this is only a conjecture because the markup for re-exports to Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom appears to be, respectively, trendless, increasing over time, and decreasing slightly over time. In work under progress, we are determining how much each of the movements of the national average markup could be attributable to movements in the markup of particular products (i.e. markup is unstable but composition of products is stable), and to changes in the composition of re-exports (i.e. composition of products is unstable but individual markup is stable).
Markup on Hong Kong Re-exports from the U.S. to China
We turn next to the issue of U.S. exports to China that pass through Hong Kong. While there are rather substantial markups on the re-exports from China to the U.S. (eastbound trade), existing studies have found smaller markups on the re-exports from the U.S. to China 9 This calculation is described in detail in the Appendix. 10 The variation in the markups is greater as one considers Hong Kong re-exports from China to developed versus developing countries, such as the U.S. versus African nations. In that case, we find that the markups to Africa are negative in some cases, suggesting that the lowest-quality goods are sent there. A computer disk containing the markup calculations for all country pairs, and for various commodities, is under preparation and will be available from the authors.
(westbound trade Table 4 .
We see that from 1984-87 the markups are positive, but after that the markups become negative beginning in 1988. The more puzzling finding is that the post-1987 markups sometimes indicate a reduction in the re-export value, such as more than 100%, that is much too large to be believable. 12 While mark-downs in the value of particular goods must occur in some instances, it is doubtful that they occur across most goods frequently, and by over 100 percent three times in the 1984-95 period. Our assessment is that the very large mark-downs reflect measurement errors in the data. In particular, since the unit-value for each traded item is constructed by dividing the value by the quantity, then any inaccuracy in the quantity (such as change in units when re-shipped) will result in measurement error in the unit-values.
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In fact, measurement error was already found when we consider the re-export from China to the U.S. (eastbound trade), in Table 2 . As indicated there, several of the markup estimates were made while omitting some outlying observations (i.e. particular SITC or harmonized system categories). A good example is the markup for 1994, using method A. When all the harmonized system categories are included, the markup obtained is 19.4%, as compared to 29.3% (reported in Table 2 ) after several observations are omitted. The difference between these two estimates is almost entirely explained by a single harmonized system category -HS 26090000, which is tin ores and concentrates. Evidence that its quantity is incorrectly measured in re-exports comes from the fact that the re-export quantity is 617 times greater than the quantity that Hong Kong imported from China in 1994! This almost surely reflects measurement error in the data, and when this single observation is omitted, the estimated markup becomes much closer to that obtained in surrounding years.
Whenever the re-export quantity is greater than the import quantity, we shall interpret this as evidence of measurement error, such as different units in measuring quantities. We compute the ratio QRATIO=(quantity re-exported through Hong Kong)/(quantity imported into Hong Kong) to alert us to the measurement problem. The storage of commodities would make the reexport quantity greater than the import quantity, so some values of QATIO greater than unity might still be acceptable. We therefore consider two criterion for eliminating outliers: first, omitting all harmonized system categories for which QRATIO>2; and, second, omitting all harmonized system categories for which QRATIO>1. The second criterion is stricter than the first, in the sense that more observations are omitted. (The actual number of observation deleted is reported in the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2 ).
The results for the Hong Kong re-exports from the United States to China are shown in Table 4 . When the observations with QRATIO>2 are omitted, the extremely large and negative markups are eliminated, and most of the negative values occurring after 1988 are quite small.
When the additional observations with QRATIO>1 are omitted, then the negative markups are eliminated almost entirely, except for 1994 and 1995. Based on this evidence, we conclude that more realistic markups are obtained when the outlying observations (as identified by QRATIO) are omitted. Generally, excluding these observation raises the markup. This follows because the observation with high values of QRATIO will necessarily have a low value for the markups on re-exports, so that excluding these erroneous observations will raise the overall markup.
Hence, our preferred value for the markups are those shown in the last columns of Table   4 (omitting all observations with QRATIO>1). In the Appendix, we also report the markups obtained on eastbound trade when outlying observation are excluded. These are generally higher than those reported in Table 2 , indicating that even our preferred estimates in Table 2 (i.e. method C), may be an underestimate of the "true" markup.
The final columns of Table 4 indicate a decline in the markup over time. This decline could be partly due to more competition among traders in the re-sale of goods to China, and partly to due to exchange rate movements during this period. In particular, there is a very large fall in the markup from 20 percent in 1987 to 8 percent in 1988, which occurs simultaneously with an large percent depreciation of the Chinese Yuan against the U.S. dollar. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , where we plot the markups from Methods A and B (from Table 5 , deleting observation with QRATIO>1) and the exchange rate between the Chinese yuan and the U.S.
dollar.
14 If many Hong Kong companies had signed yuan-denominated contracts in 1987 to deliver U.S.-made goods to China, then the large unexpected depreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar would naturally reduce the markup on re-exports. While contracts may explain the 1987-88 drop in the markup, it is surprising that the fall in the markup has apparently been permanent.
Revised Values for U.S.-China Trade Deficit
We can now use the estimated markups for goods shipped through Hong Kong to revise and reconcile the differing values for U.S.-China trade. The key principle is that the value-added on goods as they pass through Hong Kong should be attributed to Hong Kong, rather than treated as an export of some other country. This value-added is computed as the Hong Kong markup times the re-export value of the goods as they leave Hong Kong. Thus, for eastbound trade in part A of Table 5 , the first column shows the value-added on Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods to the United States. This is obtained by using the Hong Kong value for these re-exports, multiplied by the markups obtained by method C in Table 2 . In 1995, for example, the Hong Kong re-exported $27.5 billion in goods from China to the U.S. (Table 1A , column 5), of which we attribute $7 billion as the value-added in Hong Kong (Table 5A , column 1).
This value-added in Hong Kong should be deducted from the value that the United States reports as imports from China, which was $45.5 billion in 1995 (Table 1A , column 1), to obtain the revised value of U.S. imports of $38.3 billion (Table 5A , column 2). This revised figure therefore corrects for the policy of the U.S. Department of Commerce to attribute the value of all Chinese goods passing through Hong Kong en route to the United States as Chinese exports, thereby ignoring the value-added in Hong Kong. The value for Chinese exports to the U.S. also needs to be adjusted, to reflect the fact that many of these exports are simply not recorded.
Instead of using the Chinese value for the exports to the United States via Hong Kong (Table 1A, column 4), we instead use the value reported by Hong Kong for Chinese re-exports to the U.S.
Kong (Table 1A , column 5), less the value-added onto these goods in Hong Kong. This calculation yields the revised figure for Chinese exports to the United States of $30.8 billion in 1995 (Table 5A , column 3).
The discrepancy between the revised U.S. imports from China and the Chinese exports to the U.S. is now $7.5 billion. A small amount of this discrepancy reflects factors such as: differences in the geographic territories considered by the two countries (the U.S. includes
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as part of its customs territories, whereas China does not); the U.S. includes the value of repairs as imports whereas China does not include these as exports; and other factors identified in the interagency report. While the discrepancy is still sizable, it is much less than the original discrepancy of $20.3 in the reported value from each country. Thus, by properly attributed the value-added to Hong Kong, we have reduced to discrepancy in the U.S. and Chinese values for eastbound trade to about one-third of its original magnitude.
Revised values for westbound trade are considered in part B of Table 5 . The Hong Kong value-added shown in the first column is computed using the simple average of the markups Hong Kong dollar and the U.S. dollar ranged between 7.7 and 7.8 HK$ per US$.
obtained from methods A and B in Table 4 (with QRATIO>1) . 15 Because these markups are all rather small, the precise figures which are used has little influence on the results. The revised value of U.S. exports shown in the second column is obtained from the published value of U.S.
exports (Table 1B , column 1), and adding the value reported by Hong Kong for U.S. re-exports to the China (Table 1B , column 5), less the value-added onto these goods in Hong Kong. In 1995, this results in U.S. exports to China of $16.7 billion, as compared to the reported value of $11.8 billion. Taking the difference between these exports and the revised value of U.S. imports from China in 1995, we obtain the trade deficit of $21.6 billion in 1995 (shown in part C of Table ) . This compares with a deficit of $33.8 billion using the published U.S. figure for 1995, so that our revised estimate is about two-thirds of its original value.
Turning to the Chinese data, the published import data from the U.S. is recorded on a c.i.f. (cost including freight) basis, whereas the U.S. export are recorded as f.a.s. (free along side), which does not include any transportation charges. In order to make these comparable, we multiply the original Chinese imports by 0.94, which offsets the inclusion of transportation charges. The revised value for Chinese imports from the U.S. is $15.2 billion in 1995 (Table 5B, column 3). Taking the difference with the revised value for U.S. exports to China we obtain a discrepancy of -$1.6 billion, with the U.S. exports being higher. This compares to a discrepancy of $4.4 billion in the published figures, with the U.S. exports being less than Chinese imports.
Thus, the discrepancy is reduced to about one-third of its original magnitude.
Much of remaining difference on westbound trade reflects the treatment of aircraft exports to China, as well as car exports. The Chinese Customs authorities treat aircraft exports from the U.S. as a lease, and count only the value of the lease that year, whereas the United States counts the entire value of the aircraft as an export. 16 In addition, cars brought into China by foreigners for personal use are not included in published trade statistics, whereas the U.S.
would include these as exports, which also helps to explain why the revised U.S. exports are higher.
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Taking the difference between the revised value of Chinese imports and exports with the U.S., we obtain another estimate of the U.S.-China trade deficit shown in the second column of 
Explaining the Bilateral Trade Deficit
We begin by laying out the determination of the overall current account (CA) position, within which the overall trade balance is the most important component. Broadly speaking, the primary determinants of the overall trade balance are macroeconomic and structural in nature, 16 The interagency report estimates that the Chinese imports of aircraft would need to be increased by $785 million in 1992 and $1,089 million in 1993 to be consistent with the U.S. treatment of aircraft. 17 The interagency report estimates that the Chinese imports of cars would need to be increased by $199 million in 1993 to be consistent with the U.S. treatment of cars. more.
An appreciation of the exchange rate should reduce CA by lowering the private saving rate because the rise in the purchasing power of domestic wealth would reduce the amount needed to be saved in order to make the required purchase. Investment spending could also increase because the decline in the price of imported capital goods would allow more investment projects to be implemented sooner.
The ability of import liberalization to reduce a CA surplus requires that: (a) it can to generate the same wealth effects as an appreciation of the currency; and/or (b) the resulting investment boom in the export sector and nontraded goods sector be greater than the collapse in investment in the import-competing sector 20 ; and/or (c) saving to decline substantially because of previous intertemporal substitution, where consumers, in the past, had expected an eventual decline in the prices of imports, and postponed their consumption. The import liberalization would hence release the pent-up demand for imports.
The uncertainty over the efficacy of import liberalization to change the overall trade balance significantly in a sustained way can also be seen in terms of sectoral production. Import The US-China Bilateral Trade Deficit Table 6 shows that the bilateral trade balance swung from a surplus of $3 billion in 1980
to a deficit of $40 billion in 1996. This reversal of the bilateral trade balance is in line with the opposite movements in the overall trade balance of the two countries.
The US overall trade deficit increased from $23 billion in 1980 to $170 billion in 1996, or, equivalently, from 0.8 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent of GDP. In this period, the private saving rate fell as personal consumption increased from 63 percent of GDP to 68 percent of GDP. It is hence quite natural that of the 25 largest US trade partners, 18 of them ran surpluses in their trade with the US in 1996 compared to only 8 countries in 1980.
Just as US saving-investment behavior was widening the US overall trade deficit, macroeconomic forces within China were reducing China's overall trade deficit. China's consolidated budget deficit (formal government budget deficit plus central bank financing of SOE losses) amounted to about 6 percent of GDP for the last two years, which is down from the 8 percent of the previous three years. Monetary policy has also been tight. It is hence not surprising that China's overall trade balance has gone from a deficit of $11 billion in 1993 to a surplus of $20 billion in 1996, where were -2 percent of GDP and 2 percent of GDP respectively.
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Hence lies the first important determinant of the bilateral trade balance: the opposite movements of macroeconomic forces in the two countries, reinforced by demographic trends and by China's reforms. To a first approximation, the widening bilateral trade deficit reflected the saving slow down in the US (that has been pulling in foreign resources to finance capital formation) and the surge in investment-motivated saving in China (that was necessary to compensate for the low level of financial intermediation available to the increasingly liberalized non-state sector). It is difficult to say that Southeast Asia's share of the US market has been reduced by the emergence of China as a trading state. While Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (the ASEAN-4) have seen their collective share of US overall trade deficit falling from 19 percent in 22 The tight money policy also caused the capital account in 1996 to be in surplus because it forced many SOEs to remit their unreported export earnings home for working capital. 23 The extent of this relocation of production to China is sensitive to the time period. For example, NIC-4 accounted for 23 percent of the overall US trade deficit in 1988 and 4 percent in 1996, while China's share of the US overall trade deficit grew from 2.6 percent in 1988 to 23.2 percent in 1996 -a drop of 19 percentage points, and a gain of 21 percentage points respectively. But, much less correspondence is seen if the 1985-96 period is considered instead: a "mere" 13 percentage point drop in the NIC-4's share of the US overall trade deficit compared with the 23 percentage point rise in China's share.
1980 to 12 percent in 1996, it is important to note that ASEAN-4's share rose throughout 1985-96 subperiod when China really began serious integration into the global economy. Table 7 confirms the view that the developments in US-China bilateral trade deficit over the last decade mirrored opposite developments in US trade with NIC-4. NIC-4's share of US imports dropped 4.0 percentage points over the 1988-96 period, while China's share rose 4.6
percentage points in the same period. The point that China's penetration of the US market has come largely at the expense of its industrialised Asian neighbors is vividly seen in Table 8 which reports the top 5 suppliers by selected commodities in US imports. 24 By 1995, China has displaced South Korea as one of the top 5 suppliers of "apparel and other textile products" and "leather and leather products"; displaced Japan as a top 5 supplier of "household appliances" and "other manufacturing"; and displaced Taiwan as a top 5 supplier of "miscellaneous plastic products," "other paper and allied products," and "stone, clay, concrete and gypsum"; and displaced Indonesia as a top 5 supplier of "lumber, wood, and furniture."
Concluding Remarks
We found that proper adjustment for value added in Hong Kong on China's exports going to the US reduced (on the average) 91 percent of the discrepancy between the official US and official China estimates of the US-China bilateral trade balance. Our revised estimates for the US data reduced the official US estimate of the bilateral trade deficit by a third on the average.
The same adjustments on the official Chinese estimates of the US-China bilateral trade balance 24 The data in Table 8 is drawn from the Statistics Canada World Trade Database, which incorrectly attributes a good deal of Chinese trade to Hong Kong (i.e. it relies on Chinese official trade data, which understates its exports to the U.S. and other countries). Therefore, the Chinese share of these markets in the United States is even larger than reported in Table 8 .
converted the surpluses of 1988-92 to deficits, and magnified the deficits of 1993-95 by a factor of two.
The increase in the bilateral trade deficits in the 1990s reflects the stance of macroeconomic policies and structural conditions in both countries. The United States had an investment boom that was sucking in foreign funds from high-saving countries like China. If the post-1978 surge in investment-motivated saving in China is responsible for some of the rise in the household saving rate, then the provision of more financial intermediation to facilitate investment by the non-state sector will help to reduce China's overall trade surplus, and attenuate the wrong image of China as a mercantilist state. As the Chinese financial system is relatively backward compared to that of the United States, the granting of permission to more US financial institutions to operate in China will not only improve financial intermediation but will also provide a learning opportunity for Chinese financial institutions.
Increased trade benefits both countries, and the rest of the world. It is therefore important for the future growth of the world trading system that agreement be reached soon on the conditions of China's accession into WTO. 
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ASEAN-4 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand collectively.
NIC-4 refers to the newly-industrialised countries Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan collectively.
NIC-3 refers to the newly-industrialised countries Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan collectively. Tables 6 and 7 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Year Markups (%) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Year Value ($ billion) US data China data Rev. US Rev. China
Source for
Appendix: Calculation of Markups
The data used to compute the markups were the disaggregate Hong Kong import and reexport data, at the six-digit SITC (Rev. 2) level for 1988-1991, the five-digit SITC (Rev. 3) level for 1992-1993, and the eight-digit Harmonized System level for 1994-1995. In addition, we used the disaggregate Chinese export data at the five-digit SITC level for 1988-1991 and the sixdigit Harmonized System level for 1992-1995. Initially, all markups were computed relative to the import value into Hong Kong. Let this markup be denoted by M 1 . For the purposes of presentation in this paper, they have been re-expressed as relative to the re-export value from Hong Kong, which is denoted by M 2 . The relationship between these two is simply M 2 =M 1 /(1+M 1 ). In this appendix, we will discuss how the margin M 1 was computed.
Eastbound Trade (China to the United States via Hong Kong)
Let the unit-value of Hong Kong imports from China be denoted by PM i = VM i /QM i , where VM i is the value and QM i is the quantity of imports, and i denotes the SITC or HS category. Let the unit-value of Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods to the United States be denoted by PX i =VX i /QX i , where VX i is the value and QX i is the quantity of re-exports to the U.S. Then Method A compares PX i and PM i . The formula used to obtain the re-export markup aggregated over all SITC or HS is: 
For Method B, the same formula is used, except that the unit-value of Hong Kong re-exports to 
To interpret this formula, the term (PUS i /PHK i )PM i takes the unit-value of Hong Kong imports from China (PM i ), and increases it by the ratio of the Chinese unit-value of exports to Hong Kong destined for the United States, relative to the unit-value of total exports to Hong Kong (PUS i /PHK i ). The latter ratio is computed from the Chinese data, which may be incomplete in its reporting of goods bound for Hong Kong. Because of this, we weighted the first term by the ratio of the quantity of Chinese exports to Hong Kong destined for the United States (QUS i ) to the total Hong Kong re-exports from China to the U.S. (QX i ). 25 The final term in (2) reflects the remainder of the quantity weighting, and for these goods we simply use the unit-value of Hong Kong imports from China (PM i ) as the estimate of the unit-value for Hong
Kong imports from China that are bound for the United States.
To conclude, the Method C margin is obtained as: 
where PX i denotes the unit-value of Hong Kong re-exports from China to the United States.
In Appendix Table A2 , we report the markups M 2 =M 1 (1+M 1 ) obtained from these calculations, where N is the number of observations that were used in each case. The value of QRATIO equals the quantity of Hong Kong re-exports in each SITC or HS category, relative to the quantity of Hong Kong imports. Observing how N falls as observations with QRATIO>2 or QRATIO>1 are omitted shows how many observations have these outlying values.
The markups for Method A and Method B were initially done at the six-digit SITC level for 1988-1991, the five-digit SITC level for 1992-1993, and the eight-digit Harmonized System level for 1994-1995, using the Hong Kong data. The unit-value were then aggregated to fivedigit SITC level for 1988-1991, and to the six-digit Harmonized System level for 1994-1995, so that they could be merged with the Chinese data. This aggregation did not affect the results for Methods A and B. The Chinese data used the five-digit SITC level for 1988-1991 and the six- 25 If this ratio ever exceeded unity, then we replaced it with the value of unity.
